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城市最低生活保障中的逆向选择及道德风险规避
时间:2011-02-18 浏览次数:1434次 无忧论文网
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社会保障
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    十六届六中全会《关于构建社会主义和谐社会若干重大问题的决定》提出要把加强制度建设、维护公平正义作为构建和谐社会的重要任务之一,并加强对困难群众的救助,完善城市低保制度。可以说,城市最低生活保障是实现和谐社会的一个重要前提和基础。然而,现行城市最低生活保障在发挥社会最后安全网作用的同时,也面临如何走出效率低下的困境。固有的信息不对称,加上政策本身的缺陷,使城市低保中的逆向选择及道德风险问题缺乏有效的应对机制。由此本文聚焦于对低保对象管理问题进行探讨,以找出问题症结并提出相关对策。     本文共五章:  第一章为导论,介绍了研究背景、相关研究综述以及本文研究思路和框架。          第二章介绍了信息经济学关于逆向选择及道德风险的理论,并分别分析其在城市最低生活保障中的具体表现,如“假低保”;“不合理开支”,“隐性就业”,“低保懒汉”,“逃避劳动义务”等。     第三章通过理论和现实相结合分析了出现上述问题的原因。本文认为低保违规行为是信息不对称条件下理性经济人采取的博弈行为和搭便车行为,同时也是贫困人群的无奈选择。本节还分析了低保对象管理问题所产生的影响。第四章以大连、香港以及国外部分国家为例,对国内外城市最低生活保障对象管理经验作了总结。第五章提出了低保“参与式治理路径”,强调各类组织和人员共同参与到低保管理中来。并从四个方面分析如何规避低保逆向选择及道德风险问题。本文的创新之处在于:从信息经济学入手,对低保制度运行中出现的逆向选择及道德风险问题的表现、原因作了较详细的梳理,并遵循法律支持——制度完善并规范操作——组织依托——专业人员介入——群体参与的治理路径,提出对策。由于相关专业知识面的限制,本文还存在一些不足之处,如研究方法偏定性,同时对个别问题的研究还有待进一步深入。   [英文摘要]:     The CPC Central Committee's Decision of Some Important Issues on Building a Socialist Harmonious Society Mentions that,we should strengthen the building of systems and maintain fairness and justice, and make them as one of the important tasks in building of a socialist harmonious society. We should strengthen the aid toward the people in difficulty as well as perfect the social security. So this paper makes the urban minimum living guarantee as the theme and talks about the management problem of the object in urban minimum living guarantee. While current urban minimum living guarantee system is guaranteeing the basic life level of poor group, it also faces how to go out of the plight caused by moral hazard. Inherent information asymmetric, plus of policy defect, all leads to the lack of coping mechanisms toward the adverse selection and moral hazard. This paper tries to analyze the mechanisms in minimum livelihood guarantee system for urban, and proposes the measure as well as find out the reasons of problem. This paper can be divided into five parts. The first part introduces research background, summary and framework. The second part introduces the theory about adverse selection and moral hazard in Information Economics, and analyzes their performance in minimal assurance, such as "false minimal assurance", "hidden employment", "lazy person in minimal assurance", and so on. The third part analyzes the reasons from theoretical and practical level. It thinks that violations in the minimal assurance can be attributed to game acts and acts of hitchhiking by rational economic men under condition of information asymmetric, as well as helplessness choices by poor who lacks of human and social capital in support. At the meantime, it analyzes the efficiency affected by target management issues. The fourth part uses the example of some developed countries as well as Hong   Kong and Dalian city inland, to summarize the management experience in minimal assurance system. The fifth part proposes the "Path of Participatory Governance". And then analyzes how to avoid the adverse selection and moral hazard. The paper's main innovation is that it analyzes the problem as well as reasons of adverse selection and moral hazard in the urban minimum living guarantee with Information Economics. Following path of law-system-organization-professional   -group, it proposes the countermeasures. As limit of the professional knowledge, the research method of the paper is partial characterization. And research of some problem is to be further clear.      
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