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财政分权、腐败与地方经济增长
时间:2011-03-23 浏览次数:1513次 无忧论文网
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数量经济学
公共经济学和宏观经济学公共经济学和宏观经济学
    从计划经济向市场经济的转变首要和关键的便是政府角色的改变,要从一个高度集权和全面干预经济的政府转变为一个地方分权和对市场经济起有益补充、促进市场经济良性发展的政府。在我国,一方面采取以财政包干和分税制为特征的财政分权制度,使得发展本地经济会给地方政府官员带来经济上的激励;另一方面,通过中央任命地方政府官员的政治集权制度,以GDP为中心内容的政绩成为地方政府官员升迁的重要依据则给地方政府官员带来政治上的激励。无论是经济激励还是政治激励,都赋予了地方政府提高GDP的强劲动力。
    考虑两种不同的经济生产方式,一种是保护环境的“好”的生产方式,另一种是破坏环境的“坏” 的生产方式。两种生产技术的产量相等,不同的是选择“好” 的生产方式需要额外的成本,而选择“坏”的生产方式将会给全社会形成“负”的外部性,即带来环境污染问题。由于经济发展的环境成本通常需要较长一段时间才能显现,因此在一届地方政府相对短的任期内,中央政府实际上很难观察到当地经济发展的真实的环境成本。为了追求短期GDP的增长,地方政府可能会默许资本运用“坏” 的生产方式。本文的主要目的便是详细研究不同情况下地方政府由于目标不同而导致其行为决策的截然不同的内在机制。此外,本文分析了当地方政府出现腐败时的情况。
    本文建立的模型和主要的结论如下:
    一、通过动态和静态模型表明当不存在政府时,代表性家庭(个人)在考虑长期效用时,将把资本同时投资于“好”的和“坏”的生产方式;而只考虑当期利益时,将把资本完全投资于“坏”的生产方式。
    二、通过动态模型表明,政府如果考虑代表性家庭(个人)的长期效用,则能够通过税收和财政手段达到引导资本投资于“好” 的生产方式的目标,在均衡时代表性家庭(个人)将把资本完全投资于“好”的生产方式。
    三、通过研究存在地方政府的静态均衡,表明地方政府在财政分权体制下,是否考虑“坏”的生产方式所带来的负的外部性即环境成本将决定其不同的行为。一个并不考虑“坏” 的生产方式所带来的负的外部性的地方政府仅仅通过降低处罚率就可以比那些考虑“坏” 的生产方式所带来的负的外部性的地方政府达到更大的GDP增长率。
    四、在静态均衡中考虑了地方政府存在腐败的因素,表明投入腐败的资本受到地方政府对“坏”的生产方式处罚轻重的影响。如果处罚率相对较高,那么代表性家庭(个人)则需要通过贿赂降低被征税的概率,来使产出最大化。
    本文的创新之处是研究各地方政府在中央政府的经济和政治激励下,如何通过不同的行为决策来达到不同的当地经济增长目标。 [英文摘要]:     Reforming the government is a crucial component of both the transition from a planned to a market economy and economic development. Creating thriving markets in these economies typically requires transforming a highly centralized and interventionist government into one that supports the market and fosters decentralized economic activities. In China, on the one hand, fiscal system, characterized as “fiscal contracting system” and “separating tax system”, gives local government fiscal incentives. On the other hand, the vertical control system with local officials appointed by the central government, by which the central government reward and punish local officials on the basis of their economic performance, gives local government political incentives. Whether fiscal or political incentives, these motivate local officials to promote the local economy.
    There are two different production technologies. “Good” technology is a way to protect environment or save resources. “Bad” technology destroys environment and wastes resources. Both technologies generate the same output. However, their costs differ. “Good” technology has extra cost. “Bad” technology creates a negative externality. Because the cost of economic development will not appear until a long period have past, the central government does not observe the real cost in a relative short tenure of local government. Local government connives that the capital may adopt the “bad” technology for the aim of economic growth in a short period. In addition, this article analyses the behavior of local government when corruption occurs.  
    The models and main conclusions of this article are the following:
    1. By using the dynamic and static models, we show that representative household (individual) will invest both in “good” and “bad” technology after considering long-term utility, and invest only in “bad” technology when considering current interests.
    2. By using the dynamic model, we show that the government can utilize tax and fiscal means to lead capital invest in “good” technology when considering the long-term utility of the representative household (individual). At equilibrium representative household (individual) will invest all in “good” technology.
    3. By studying the static equilibrium with local government, we show that under fiscal decentralization system, whether or not considering the negative externality brought from “bad” technology will decide different behavior of local government. A local government which does not consider the negative externality brought from “bad” technology will acquire higher GDP growth rate only by reducing punishment rate than a local government which does.
    4. By studying the static equilibrium with corruption in local government, we show that the capital invested in corruption will be influenced by the punishment rate local government imposes on “bad” technology. At a relative high punishment rate, representative household (individual) need bribe local government to reduce the tax probability for maximizing output.
    The innovation of this article is to investigate how local governments make different decisions for different local economic growth aims under fiscal and political incentives of central government.        
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